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JUSTICE AND COST-CONTAINMENT IN
END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE
Brian V Johnstone*

The End-Stage Renal Disease Program ("ESRD"), launched by the Federal Government in 1972, has been evaluated both positively and negatively.
There is significant research on the subject.' But a final verdict cannot yet
be reached. There are at least three major criticisms which could be made of
the program: 1) the decision-making process by which the program was established was seriously faulty;2 2) the program is too expensive; 3) the therapy for renal failure, in terms of the benefits to patients, is not worth this
cost. 3 This article addresses the first of these two criticisms.
The negative assessments have influenced policies in other areas. For example, it has been reported that the experience with renal dialysis has con* Associate Professor of Moral Theology, The Catholic University of America. B.
Theol. St. Mary's Seminary, Ballarat, Australia, 1965; Licentiate in Theology, Collegium Anselmaianum, Rome, 1969; Ph.D. (S.T.D.), The Catholic University of Leuven, 1973.
The research for this article was supported by a grant from NIH. The author has benefitted
from the invaluable assistance of Dr. Rosemary Donley.
1. See Eggers, Connerton & McMullan, The Medicare Experience with End-Stage Renal
Disease: Trends in Incidence, Prevalence, and Survival, 5 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 69
(1983-84) [hereinafter Eggers]; Evans, Manninen, Garrison, Hart, Blagg, Gutman, Hull &
Lowrie, The Quality ofLife of Patients with End-Stage Renal Disease, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED.
553 (1985); Evans, Manninen, Hart & Garrison, Part L The National Kidney Dialysis and
Kidney Transplantation Study: A Summary of Results, 1985 CONTEMP. DIALYSIS &
NEPHROLOGY 41; Evans, Manninen, Hart & Garrison, Part 11. The NationalKidney Dialysis
and Kidney Transplantation Study. A Summary of Results, 1985 CONTEMP. DIALYSIS &
NEPHROLOGY 42; Evans, Manninen, Hart & Garrison, Part 111. The NationalKidney Dialysis
and Kidney Transplantation Study: Selected Findings, 1985 CONTEMP. DIALYSIS &
NEPHROLOGY 41. The decision-making by patients, families and physicians regarding dialysis
and transplantation is the subject of a NIH funded research program at the Catholic University of America entitled: Therapeutic Options in End-Stage Renal Disease, principal researcher
Dr. Mary Elizabeth O'Brien.
2. For example, in a recent work, Joseph Califano stated that, "The end-stage renal disease program is a classic example of effective lobbying by financially interested providers,
human interest appeal and generous-to-the-point-of-waste social policy." J. CALIFANO, JR.,
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? WHO PAYS? 146 (1986).
3. See Dessner, Stopping Long-Term Dialysis, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1449 (1986) (The
author claims that this was the impression given to the public by the article by Neu & Kjellstrand, Stopping Long-Term Dialysis. An Empirical Study of Withdrawal of Life-Supporting
Treatment, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 14 (1986)). A response to this criticism would require
further research. The issue will not be addressed in this paper.
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tributed significantly to the caution that has accompanied the development
of liver and heart transplantations. 4 While technology will no doubt continue to produce life-saving treatments, it has been plausibly argued that, in
view of the unexpectedly high costs of the ESRD program, not all such technologies are likely to be so funded.5 On the other hand, it could be argued
that the program has brought great benefits to many. On the basis of the
positive outcomes, a case could be made for extending government support
for health care. Thus, proponents of national health insurance have argued
that the ESRD program provides necessary services to persons who could
not pay for them from their own resources, and that government interven6
tion in this case has had the direct result of saving thousands of lives.
How

WAS THE DECISION MADE TO FUND

ESRD?

There are, of course, two basic treatments available to persons with endstage renal disease - transplantation and dialysis. Transplantation was first
successfully performed on identical twins in 1956. Successful transplants of
kidneys from cadavers were first performed in the early sixties.7 The artificial kidney was developed by the physician Willem Kolff in the Netherlands
in the early 1940's. In the 1960's, the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center, the
first major clinical center to apply a machine to replace kidney function, was
opened.' However, during the next five years only 800 people were receiving
hemodialysis even though those in need of it were estimated to number tens
of thousands. 9 During the late 1960's and early 1970's renal dialysis and
kidney transplants had an ambiguous status in the minds of many health
professionals, somewhere between experiment and therapy.' ° The concerns
which gave rise to hesitation were not simply the costs but questions as to
whether the procedures offered genuine therapeutic benefits for patients. In
this period, prior to government funding, a great scarcity of resources pre4. Engelhardt, Allocating Scarce Medical Resources and the Availability of Organ Trans-

plantation: Some Moral Presuppositions, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 67 (1984).
5. Kilner, Who Receives Scarce Medical Resources? An Empirical and Ethical Study,
1985 THE ANN. SOC'Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 159.
6. Caplan, Kidneys, Ethics and Politics: Policy Lessons of the ESRD Experience, 6 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 488, 489 (1981-82).
7. Eggers, supra note 1, at 69.
8. S. REISER & M. ANBAR, THE MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE: STRATEGIES FOR USING
TECHNOLOGY IN PATIENT CARE 14 (1984).

9. Sanders & Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REV. 366, 367 (1968).
10. Caplan, supra note 6, at 490. According to Caplan, if this conceptual and empirical
ambiguity which surrounded the evolution of renal therapies and the ESRD program for reimbursement is ignored, we risk missing the point in seeking to frame the moral issues related to
those suffering from renal failures.

1987]

End-Stage Renal Disease

vailed. In this situation, acutely difficult decisions on selecting patients, with
all the attendant moral ambiguity, were unavoidable.'" It has been proposed
funding was to avoid
that one of the reasons for the decision to provide
12
having to make these difficult moral decisions.
In 1966 and 1967, two reports were put together which were an integral
part of the ESRD policy formulation process: 1) Report of the Committee
on Chronic Kidney Disease to the U.S. Bureau of the Budget ("Gottschalk
Report") and 2) Kidney Disease Program Analysis: Report to the Surgeon
General ("Burton Report"). The Gottschalk Report, which was more influential, judged that the two forms of therapy were "sufficiently well advanced
today to warrant launching a national program."' 3 One important effect of
this report was to support a general acceptance of dialysis and transplantation as therapy.14 After the Gottschalk Committee's report, several bills incorporating the report's recommendations were proposed in Congress, but
none were enacted. 15
In 1965, the Kidney Disease Control Program ("KDCP") funded a
number of treatment centers around the country to demonstrate the organizational feasibility of dialysis in various settings. Many of these centers became nationally prominent provider institutions. In 1969, the KDCP
became part of the Regional Medical Programs; emphasis was then placed
11. The criteria for selection of patients in the 1960's included biomedical criteria.
"[O]nly half the dialysis centers in the United States [in 1967] had explicit medical criteria for
selecting or rejecting a patient. Recurrently used contraindications were: . . . age and existence of other major disease states, such as diabetes, severe cardiovascular disease, and [cancer]." Fox, The Medical Profession's Changing Outlook on Hemodialysis (1950-1976), in
ESSAYS IN MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY: JOURNEYS INTO THE FIELD 122, 123 (1979). There were

also psychological and social criteria. These tended to blur into social background, social
status, and social worth considerations. Other selection bases such as first-come, first-serve,
random lotterv, and ability to pay were also used. Selection committees made up of medical
professionals were organized but the predominant role in voting on patient selection was
played by physicians, who were the primary gatekeepers. Id. Prior to 1973, patient selection
for dialysis was by physicians or committee or first-come, first-serve basis or selection criteria

including age, medical suitability, mental acuity, family environment, criminal record, economic status, employment record, availability of transportation, compliance with renal dialysis
procedure, rehabilitation potential, psychiatric evaluation, marital status, educational back-

ground, occupation and future potential. See Evans, Blagg & Bryan, A Social and Demographic Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 J. A.M.A. 487 (1981).
12. See Childress, Allocating Health Care Resourses, in PRIORITIES IN BIOMEDICAL
ICS

ETH-

77, 89-90 (1981); Kilner, supra note 5, at 158.
13. Rettig, Background Paper 2: Case Studies of Medical Technologies Case Study 1: For-

mal Analysis, Policy Formulation, and End-Stage Renal Disease, in
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY (U.S.

nology Assessment Apr. 1981).
14. Id. at 21; Caplan, supra note 6, at 493.
15. Rettig, supra note 13, at 21.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF

Congress, Office of Tech-
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on building dialysis facility capacity in this country. In 1963, the Veterans
Administration ("VA") announced its intention to establish dialysis centers
for eligible veterans in thirty VA hospitals. At the time of the passage of the
1972 amendments, VA hospitals were dialyzing one-fourth of the nation's
dialysis patients.' 6 The VA's submission of a budget request to the Bureau
of the Budget ("BOB") for construction funds to set up dialysis units in
several VA hospitals, and for the funds to staff these hospitals, was one factor
17
which led to the establishment of the Gottschalk Committee.
There are indications of a popular mind-set, expressed in loose, but rhetorically effective "distributive justice" arguments which may have influenced
the climate in which the 1972 legislation was passed. Thus, Reiser proposes
that "the historical coincidence of the clinical use of artificial kidneys and
the emergence of a modern right to health care made the idea of limiting
access to a lifesaving procedure through an allocation process difficult to
bear."" 8 In this context, it was not surprising, he says, that the U.S. Congress passed the 1972 legislation. One popular expression of this climate was
an NBC News documentary aired on November 28, 1965, entitled "Who
Shall Live?" The program, narrated by Edwin Newman, highlighted the
contrast between the lack of funds for individuals who were in need of lifesaving dialysis treatment and the hundreds of millions of dollars which were
being spent on space exploration and weapons. Representative Melvin Laird
(R. Wis.), then ranking Republican member of the House Appropriations
Committee for Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"), was quoted as
stating: "We're spending billions of dollars to get to the moon, and it seems
to me that these human problems which we have right here on earth, need to
be solved."' 19
This type of argument is reflected again in the remarks of some of the
supporters of the 1972 legislation. For example, during the debate on funding for dialysis, Senator Lawton Chiles argued:
In this country with so much affluence, to think that there are people who will die this year merely because we do not have enough of
these machines and . . . dollars, so that we do have to make the
choice of who will live and who will die, when we already know we
have a good treatment . . . . This should not happen in this
16. Rettig, End-Stage Renal Disease and the "Cost" of Medical Technology, in

MEDICAL

TECHNOLOGY: THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE COSTS? 88, 94-95 (S. Altman & R.

Blender eds. 1979).
17. Rettig, supra note 13, at 7.
18. S. REISER & M. ANBAR, supra note 8, at 15.

19. Rettig, supra note 13, at 7. Rettig cites here the NBC News program, "Who Shall
Live?" presented Nov. 28, 1965.

1987]

End-Stage Renal Disease

country.2 °
It may be assumed that this "rescue imperative" was a powerful factor in the
decision-making process.
In summary, the following elements can be identified as significant in influencing the decision to fund - the medical acceptance of dialysis and
transplantation as beyond the stage of experimentation, a moral unease with
patient selection processes, a factual assumption that funds were available to
cover the expected costs, and a moral conviction that to withhold funds from
persons who would otherwise die was unacceptable.
The first legislation to deal with ESRD was Public Law 92-603. The process by which it was introduced and passed is quite remarkable. The legislative context was the discussion of a bill related to amending the current
Social Security law in the 92nd Congress. During this process, the Senate
Finance Committee conducted twenty days of public hearings on many aspects of Social Security and Welfare. No single group addressed the ESRD
patient, although the Senate Finance Committee filled 3,700 pages and seven
volumes with testimony. However, there was no discussion of the problems
associated with kidney disease until they were introduced onto the floor of
the Senate by Senator Hartke of Indiana on September 30, 1972, as amendment 555 (among a total number of 583 amendments). 21 According to Rettig, the decision-making process that led to Public Law 92-603 involved a
short circuit of the normal procedure of hearings on proposed legislation.22
The total amount of time initially allocated for discussion of amendment 555
was thirty minutes in the Senate. Ten minutes were added for further discussion. 2 3 As Caplan remarks, the need for therapy seemed clear to the legislators. All that stood between some 24,000 untreated persons and life was
money. Renal patients and physicians wanted the bill passed and lobbied for
it.

24

With the enactment of Public Law 92-603, individuals with ESRD were
provided this assistance through Section 2991 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972. The law extended Medicare coverage to individuals under 65
20. Quoted in Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for Victims of EndStage Renal Disease, 40 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 196, 224 (1976-77).
21. 118 CONG. REC. 33,003 (1972). Senator Hartke used the following argument for
distribution:
We spend billions of dollars each year to go from home to work, from coast to coast,
from one continent to another and from earth to space. Tens of billions of dollars are
spent on weapons to kill, on cosmetics ... to make our lives easier. We do all of this,
but when it comes to maintaining our health, we revert to primitive values.
22. Rettig, supra note 13, at 107.
23. 118 CONG. REC. 33,007 (1972).
24. Caplan, supra note 6, at 495.
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who have permanent kidney failure, and require either dialysis or transplantation.2" The ESRD program is an entitlement program, a term utilized by
Congress which is defined as a "federal program that guarantees a certain
level of benefits to persons who meet the requirements set by law.",2 6 This
means that whatever amount of money is necessary to meet the needs of
ESRD patients will be provided by the government. Congress and/or the
administration may attempt to make the program more efficient and costeffective, but they cannot change the federal budget so as to prevent a citizen
from receiving care unless they amend the original legislation.27 The ESRD
program is the only such specific disease program. In the context of this
law, the United States has essentially no restrictions for access based on age
or medical criteria.28
COSTS AND COST CONTAINMENT

Cost has been a very important consideration throughout the history of
the ESRD program in the United States. For example, Joseph Califano
records that it was decided not to extend coverage for all kidney dialysis in
the 1967 legislation "because we feared setting an expensive precedent and
because of incipient concerns about becoming hostage to medical technology. ' ' 29 In 1967, BOB, although it had set up the Gottschalk Committee,
distanced itself from the report, seeking to minimize public pressure for an
expanded ESRD program. At that time BOB was increasingly feeling the
effect of the Vietnam War demands on funds for the "Great Society." 3
Senator Hartke estimated an annual cost of $250 million at the end of four
years, with the first full year cost at about $75 million. He argued that "[t]he
90 to 110 million that this amendment will cost each year is a minor cost to
25. In general, to qualify for ESRD benefits, a person must be undergoing a regular
course of renal dialysis or have had a kidney transplant, and must be either insured under
Social Security at the onset of the disease, a monthly Social Security beneficiary, or the spouse
or dependent child of an eligible person. See Ney, The ESRD Medicare Program:A Clarification, 10 DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANTATION 227-30 (1981); Ruchlin, The Public Cost of Kidney

Disease, 9 Soc. WORK HEALTH CARE 1 (1984). At present, eligibility for Medicare coverage
begins with the third month in which a course of dialysis begins. Coverage may begin sooner if
the patient participates in a self-care dialysis training program provided by an approved facility

or receives a kidney transplant without starting or receiving dialysis.
26. Ney, supra note 25, at 227.
27. Ruchlin, supra note 25, at 3-5.
28. Eggers, supra note 1, at 70. However, while this may be the case in theory, it is not so
in practice. Kilner has carried out a study in which questionnaires were sent to the medical

directors of every kidney dialysis and transplantation facility in the United States. He found
that the supposition that no one is turned away from any dialysis facility today, and that no
one dies for lack of access to dialysis, is not correct. See Kilner, supra note 5, at 161.
29. J. CALIFANO, JR., supra note 2, at 146.

30. Rettig, supra note 13, at 19.
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maintain life."'" The actual cost was, however, double that amount. The

cost estimates were inaccurate for the first year, got worse in successive
years, and failed to consider total Medicare and total national costs.32 However, the incorrectness of these estimates were not the only factor which had
a bearing on the decision. A reading of the discussion of the amendments
(including amendment 555, the ESRD amendment) indicates that legislators
anticipated some form of national health insurance as possible and likely in
the near future. The political climate in which amendment 555 was framed
and passed did not emphasize a dominant concern with cost-containment.
Later, this became a crucial element in policy making.33
Subsequently, the ESRD Program Amendment of 1978 (Public Law 95292) sought to promote more efficiency and economy in the provision of
services by encouraging home dialysis and transplantation for the maximum
number of suitable patients." However, efforts to put the force of law behind the attainment of a significant increase in the proportion of home dialysis and self-care were notably restricted as the result of lobbying efforts by
representatives of profit-making dialysis centers. 35 The next action by Congress in regard to ESRD was in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 (Public Law 97-35). The Act directed the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") to set up a new dual reimbursement rate differentiating between hospital-based and free-standing dialysis facilities.3 6 The
reason for insisting on holding to the dual rate was a conviction that a single
rate would thwart the intent of Congress to foster home dialysis. The fear
was that hospital-based dialysis facilities which supported home patients
would be driven from the market.3 7 This again met with intense opposition
from profit-making dialysis facilities. However, the dual rate was set up by
39
Congress.3" Title VI of Public Law 98-21 dealt with prospective payment.
The most recent legislative act to have a direct bearing on ESRD was Public
31.

118 CONG. REC. 33,004 (1972).

32. Rettig, supra note 16, at 97.
33. Ruchlin, supra note 25, at 1.
34. Eggers, supra note 1, at 70.
35. Greenberg, Washington Report, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (1978).
36. Iglehart, Funding the End-Stage Renal-DiseaseProgram, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 493
(1982).
37. Id. at 493.
38. Pristave & Riley, HCFA Publishes Final ESRD Prospective Reimbursement Regulations, 12 DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANTATION 452 (1983). The composite rates went into effect on
August 1, 1983, at $131 per dialysis treatment for hospital-based facilities and $127 per dialysis
treatment for free-standing facilities.
39. See S. REP. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 351.
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Law 99-272.'
The reimbursements for ESRD Medicare beneficiaries for Fiscal Year
("FY") 1983 was $1,893.6 million, for FY 1984, $1,953.5 million, and for
FY 1985, $1,941.9 million. 4 1 Total dialysis patients in 1984 numbered
78,483, and in 1985 numbered 84,797; renal transplants in 1984 numbered
6,968, and in 1985 numbered 7,695.42

However, while the costs of the program rose considerably, the significance of the increase has to be analyzed carefully. An important incentive to
containing costs per treatment has been the payment screens for dialysis
which were established by Medicare. 4 3 It is argued that if the cost per facility treatment is adjusted for inflation, this cost has actually fallen. 44 The
increase in the overall costs of the program is due to the increase in the
number of participants (1974 - 15,993; 1984 - 78,483 dialysis patients,
6,968 transplants). The reason why the number of participants has increased
to such an extent is that the program is an entitlement program.4 5
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT

If we consider the procedure by which resources were allocated to the
ESRD program, can we form a judgment on rational grounds that the procedure was adequate for the requirements of justice and fairness? Is there an
identifiable and defensible normative framework which applies to processes
40. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 9214, 100 Stat. 82, 180 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr) set limits to the merger of EndStage Renal Disease Networks. HCFA published proposed rules, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,714 (1986)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405) (proposed Apr. 15, 1986). In a letter to Mr. Otis Bowen,
Secretary, HHS, dated June 27, 1986, Congressman Charles B. Rangel and 53 other members
of Congress stated that, the proposed regulations were seen as aiming "to restructure substan-

tially the End-Stage Renal Disease Program ("ESRD") and to reduce reimbursement for dialysis services .... " The signers expressed their deep concern at the potential impact on the
safety of kidney patients and the stability of the ESRD program. HCFA published the final
rule on August 26, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,356 (1986) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405) (proposed Aug. 26, 1986). If there were a reduction in reimbursement, this would, of course, bear

directly on the subject of this article. There is, however, no explicit requirement for such a
reduction in the proposed or final rule.
41. Telephone interview with Cathy Sage, Health Care Financing Administration, Divi-

sion of Information Analysis (Jan. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Sage Interview].
42. Health Care Financing Administration, End-Stage Renal Disease Program Highlights
(1985) (available from the Health Care Financing Administration, Division of Information
and Statistics, 6325 Security Boulevard, Baltimore, M.D. 21207).
43. R. RETTIG, IMPLEMENTING THE END STAGE RENAL DISEASE PROGRAM OF MEDICARE at ix (1980).
44. R. BOVBJERG, P. HELD & H. PAULY, MEDICARE'S END STAGE RENAL DISEASE
PROGRAM: HOW A MORE COMPETITIVE APPROACH WOULD ADDRESS IMPORTANT POLICY
ISSUES. A REPORT FOR THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 3 (Aug. 1983).

45. Ney, supra note 25, at 228.
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of decision-making? One possibility would be to consider a political decision-making process as analogous to a trial by combat. In such a case, the
outcome would be decided by whoever had the force and/or fortune to prevail. Against this it would be argued that it is basic to human society or to
the social contract to forego force and seek a resolution of differences on the
basis of morality. 46 A second possibility would be to accept that there are
moral rules for such decision-making processes, but that the only kind of
rules available are those which the participants accept by agreed-upon conventions. This is ultimately unsatisfactory since it would leave unsolved the
question of establishing the rules by which the conventions themselves could
be derived. The third possibility is that there are some rules for decisionmaking processes and that these can be discovered by rational analysis. This
is the position which will be defended here under the rubric of justice as
participation.
JUSTICE AS PARTICIPATION

The decision-makers are moral agents with commitments and duties to
their constituents and to those who will be affected by their decisions. The
ethic of agency requires that those decision makers act as rational agents in
decision-making, respecting those commitments and duties. Similarly, the
"ethic of agency" 47 requires that those affected by the decisions be able to
act as moral agents. The total process of decision-making ought to reflect a
genuine reciprocity between the persons involved. That is, the process ought
to be the joint activity of a community of moral agents. The ethic of agency,
when applied to decision-making processes, requires a particular form of justice which could be called justice as participation.48
Justice as participation would require, positively, that persons take their
part as responsible agents in the processes of decision-making, and negatively that they not be prevented from so doing. These basic requirements
are the foundation for the primary criterion of justice as participation, which
we could call "community of agency."
Responsible agency takes particular forms according to the specific com46, Engelhardt, supra note 4, at 67. Cf R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS
110 (1981).
47. I take the term "ethic of agency" from Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the
United States is so Hard- Cost ContainmentJustice and ProviderAutonomy, 314 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1986).
48. What I call "justice as participation" is grounded on the concept of the dignity of the

human person. As explained in Roman Catholic Social Teaching, this dignity is founded on
the person's being created "in the image of God," i.e., as a person, a subject, capable of acting
in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to selfrealization." See POPE JOHN-PAUL II, ON HUMAN WORK 13 (1981).
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mitments assumed by agents. Some of these commitments arise from freely
assumed roles which carry with them specific sets of duties. The responsible
agency of a legislator is governed by specific commitments to constituents, to
the Constitution and to the good of the nation. The responsible agency of
the physician is structured according to the requirements of good medicine.
Other commitments arise partly from conditions which come into being
without free choice, and partly from the free response persons make to these
conditions. Thus, the sick person's commitment to pursuing a life-project
directed to personal fulfillment is significantly modified by his sickness.
Community of agency requires that each agent in that community be acknowledged and respected as an agent with specific forms of commitment.
Thus, for example, the commitment of the physician to responsible medicine
must be respected. In other words, the physician has a role-specific autonomy within the community. Similarly, the special commitment of the sick
person to pursue a full life under conditions of special need must be
respected. Community of agency would thus require that the sick person be
respected, in the first place as an agent, and then as an agent with particular
needs. The fact of physical or mental restriction does not undermine the
moral autonomy of the person. Thus, the criterion of community of agency
gives rise to a second criterion which might be called "commitment-specific
autonomy."
Autonomy is relevant not only to individual agents, but also to groups.
There are many communities of moral agents, and each community has its
own relatively autonomous set of relationships. However, the communities
are interrelated. For example, the community of moral agents in the health
care community ought to have a certain autonomy founded on the particular
requirements of the moral agency of providers and participating recipients.
This autonomy, however, is not absolute. The members of this community
are also members of the wider community, and have duties of social justice
corresponding to the legitimate claims upon them of that wider community.
These members have benefited from the wider community and have reciprocal duties to it. Hence, agents in a community ought to respect the criterion
of social justice.
Particular structures in the community, for example those which give a
certain form to the relationships between society and individual persons, between government and citizens, between health care institutions and sick
persons, are established by policy decisions. Such policy decisions are supported by reasons which provide them with legitimation in the community.
Persons in the exercise of their moral agency are necessarily engaged with
these structures. Thus, the reasons which legitimate the structures must be
such that they can be integrated with the moral commitments of the persons
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they affect. If the reasons are not available, or fundamentally irreconcilable
with those commitments, then the community of agency is violated. Such
policies must, therefore, be legitimated by reasons which are openly stated,
accessible to all and open to critical review by all persons affected. To
express this requirement we could use the term "communicable
legitimation."
Once policies are established and appropriately legitimated, the community of agency would require that those who carry out the policies be accountable to the other members of the community. Thus, the fundamental
criterion leads to a principle of accountability.4 9
Further, the requirements of moral agency call for a negative liberty right
to freedom from coercion or manipulation, and a positive claim right to the
information necessary to form responsible judgments. Community of
agency would also require the support which might be necessary for all persons and groups to participate on an equal footing. This would mean that
affected persons and groups ought to be provided with an opportunity to
participate, equal to that available to other persons and groups who would
otherwise have advantages in information, or economic and political power.
We could call this simply the criterion of equality in participation.
In summary, responsible moral agency in decision-making ought to respect the criteria of justice as participation, community of agency, commitment-specific autonomy, social justice, legitimation, accountability and
equality.
How would these criteria apply to the procedure by which the ESRD program was established? Could the process be faulted on the grounds that it
was unduly influenced by the "rescue imperative"? Such a charge would
imply that considerations of justice were swept aside by an emotional human
interest appeal. However, the rescue imperative, although it was expressed
in a somewhat rhetorical fashion, respected some of the required criteria."0
It regarded U.S. society as a community of moral agents who would want to
save the lives of ESRD sufferers. It respected the aspirations of sufferers to
pursue the fullest life possible, thus honoring their autonomy in this respect.
It did not entail any provision which would violate the autonomy of physicians. The social justice dimension was considered in that an assessment of
the available resources was made, and the wider requirements of society considered. The case was argued openly in a way which was presumed to reflect
a community consensus.
49. Cf HASTINGS CENTER, THE ETHICS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE 34-42 (1985).
50. For example, the arguments of Senators Chiles and Hartke. See 118 CONG. REC.
33,003 (1972)
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It could be argued that the problems were not in the form in which the
case was presented, but in the content and the process. The haste precluded
an adequate investigation.5 1 If we consider the criterion of community of
agency, there is little evidence of wide consultation of patients and their families, even though it is reported that kidney patients lobbied for the program.
Iglehart, writing in 1982, remarked that "little has been heard from patients
with renal disease" in the debates on the subject.52 This seems to have been
the case from the beginning. Insofar as the process, to date, has not taken
adequate account of patients, it has failed to respect the requirements of
justice.
In relation to the criterion of equality in participation, an important consideration would be the lack of involvement of other persons likely to be
affected. Those persons who might benefit from alternative arrangements,
e.g., patients who suffer from disabilities other than ESRD of comparable
seriousness, but who did not receive the particular advantages conferred on
ESRD patients, should have been able to participate in some way. Similarly,
those who were, in effect, called on to support the program by their taxes
should have been able to take some part. In practical terms, it could be
argued that the provision of hearings would have provided an adequate opportunity for due participation by those concerned. But there were no hearings on ESRD prior to the initial decision to fund the program. Thus,
persons significantly affected by the decision were excluded altogether. The
process which led to the formulation of Public Law 92-603 would not meet
the criteria of justice and fairness on this count.
The right to relevant information must also be considered. This requirement must be taken in conjunction with the right to immunity from manipulation or coercion. The fact that interest groups sought to influence the
decision is not, in itself, a ground for declaring the process unjust or unfair.
There would be a basis for objection, however, if special interest groups
sought to manipulate the process so as to exclude other groups with a legitimate interest, and thus to deprive the decision-makers of relevant information. If the decision-makers were not provided with or precluded from
obtaining information about costs and options, which were both necessary to
a reasonable decision, and which could have been provided with reasonable
effort, then we could argue that the process entailed injustice. Similarly,
there would be violations of justice if some participants sought to pervert the
51. Three documents were printed in the record, including an article from the New York
Times, by Lawrence K. Altman and a brief statement from the National Kidney Foundation.
There is no indication that even these were considered in the thirty-minute discussion. See 118
CONG. REC. 33,004 (1972).
52. Iglehart, supra note 36, at 496.
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process, for example, by excluding or distorting information or rushing the
procedure so that all available information could not be presented.
It is difficult to know whether the information in the public record adequately reflects the process of decision-making in this case. But a preliminary judgment, on the evidence available, would be that the process was
notably deficient in some important respects. It is equally difficult to say
whether a more satisfactory process would have produced more accurate
cost assessments. But the cost question calls for a specific analysis.
DOES THE

ESRD

PROGRAM COST

Too

MUCH?

There are two fundamental issues here. Nobody wants to condemn a fellow human being to death, especially when these fellow human beings are
identifiable individuals.5 3 The second is that resources are finite and that
some kind of limit has to be set. It is clear that no plausible principles of
justice will entitle an individual patient to claim every potentially beneficial
treatment.5 4 However, it is not at all clear where limits should be set. How
much is too much? In the case of the ESRD program, this question is particularly troubling. Mr. Erwin Hytner, Staff Director of the House Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, and a congressional architect of the
program said in an interview:
The program continues to present a kind, of quandary to public
policymakers. Having gotten into it, there is no way to get out.
No one wants to go back to the death committees, but the costs are
very high and that is troubling to Congress in an era of tightening
55
resources.
There are three levels of limits. The first concerns the factor of health
expenditures as a whole, in relation to national resources. In the United
States, health costs in 1975 amounted to 8.6% of the Gross National Product ("GNP"), by 1984, they were 10.3%.56 Currently, the figure is approximately eleven percent. Can it be conclusively established that this is too
much? The second level concerns the relationship of ESRD costs to all
other health costs. In 1982, renal patients represented only one quarter of
one percent (.25%) of the Medicare beneficiaries, but they consumed about
four percent of total Medicare benefit payments and nearly ten percent of the
budget for Medicare part B, which pays for outpatient care for the elderly. 57
53. Ruchlin, supra note 25, at 8.

54. Daniels, supra note 47, at 1380.
55. Iglehart, supra note 36, at 493.
56. Telephone interview with Angela Smith, Health Care Financing Administration, Office of the Actuary (Feb. 11, 1987).
57. Ruchlin, supra note 25, at 2.
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These data explicate the tension between that group of persons which has
been granted a legal entitlement to the technology needed to save their lives
(ESRD Program beneficiaries) and other groups of persons who have
equally serious needs, but no such legally established claim. If we agree with
many authors that health care needs are in some way special, 58 can we also
argue that some health care needs are more special than others in such a way
as to justify the provisions for ESRD sufferers? This raises the question of
equality of access to health care and of equity of access.5 9 Can we solve
these questions by constructing a theory of justice and deriving from that
specific answers?
Before we can form reasonable judgments in this matter, we need to have
a framework within which to deal with the question. Daniels has argued
that questions of justice and cost-containment in the United States are beset
by a systemic problem. The problem here concerns questions of limiting
allocation of health care resources. In the British system there is a form of
rationing health care. However, when decisions are made about introducing
new procedures in the British system, they are made by weighing the net
benefits of alternatives within a closed system. That is, decisions are made to
withhold funds for certain projects on the grounds that although a certain
group of patients would benefit, this would be unfair to other patients. The
British system itself is justified on the grounds that it provides equitable access to a full range of health services that are fairly allocated on the basis of
professional judgments about which needs are most important.6 ° One might
dispute the validity of such a system on the grounds that it rests one-sidedly
on professional judgments. However, the framework is established and reasonable judgments can be made within it. For example, if Britain were to
dialyze on the same scale as the United States, it would have had to increase
its total health expenditure by over one percent. But this would have equalled the real growth in all health expenditure for two years according to the
Prime Minister's Budget Request for 1983-84. Such funding would be possible only if large sacrifices were made in other areas. 6 ' Since the system itself
is deemed to be structured so as to provide fair allocation of resources, such
a major upheaval could reasonably be judged to be contrary to justice. Daniels is at pains to point out that the existence of such a system does not
necessarily mean that the British system is in fact, just, or that the arguments which defend it are necessarily beyond dispute. Rather, the point is
58.
59.
60.
61.

N. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 17 (1985).
Id. at 59.
Daniels, supra note 47, at 1381.
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that considerations of justice are explicit in the way it is designed and in the
decisions made about allocations.6 2 On the other hand, such a system is
lacking in the United States. If a particular Medicare expenditure were to be
reduced, there is no guarantee that the funds saved will be used for a better
purpose within the health system. Rather, such reductions may merely serve
to reduce the pressure on the public budget.63 This would seem to be clearly
reflected in the arguments about funding in this country, where the need to
reduce costs is made in the name of "cost-containment" in a general sense
rather than on the basis of the needs of other areas of health care.
It would be conceivable that the withholding of funds from health care for
the sake of other non-health purposes could be justified in terms of a broader
system. Thus, a limit on the allocation of monies to health care might be
justified and required by fairness to other persons or groups with other kinds
of claims on society.
The justification for restricting expenditures on health care sometimes
takes the form that rising health costs will seriously compromise the availability and accessibility of other goods that society needs to thrive, for example: food, housing, jobs or national security. Clearly, if health care costs
would lead to national bankruptcy, or to serious damage to the food supply,
that would be "too much." Some form of rationing would be necessary and
justifiable.' But the alternatives are seldom so starkly presented. It is most
often a question of how much should be provided for some legitimate needs
rather than others.
Limitations of resources also arise because the resources of society have
been allocated in certain ways, or members of society want them to be allocated in certain ways. These may conflict with the ways in which the resources would have to be allocated to provide for health care.65 How are
such conflicts to be reasonably resolved? Such limits are examples of the
structures which shape the ways in which moral agents pursue their projects.
As has been argued above, such structures ought to be justifiable by reasons
which can be construed in terms of the justice commitments of the persons
concerned. Can such reasons be found?
In discussing changing conceptions of justice in the United States, Alasdair Maclntyre proposes two models or types of persons. 66 Type A is concerned with his deserts. This person has earned his moderate wealth over
62. Daniels, supra note 47, at 1381.

63. Id. at 1382.
64. Pellegrino, RationingHealth Care.-The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 36 (1986).

65. Engelhardt, supra note 4, at 70.
66. A.

MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY

(2d ed. 1984).
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the years. He argues that he is entitled to what he has earned and regards
the threat to his projects posed by taxes as unjust. He is thus unwilling to
pay more taxes to support expensive medical programs. The theory which
corresponds to the convictions of this type of person is that of Robert
Nozick. 67 A type B person is disturbed by the arbitrariness of inequalities in
the distribution of wealth. He regards these as unjust. He might argue for
the needs of persons, e.g., those afflicted with ESRD, that such persons have
a right to the life-saving technology available. An example of this kind of
theory is that proposed by Norman Daniels. 68 This author adapts the theory
of John Rawls. 69 According to Maclntyre, there is no way available in our
community of resolving disputes between these rival theories and claims by
having recourse to a higher theory. Maclntyre argues that modern politics
cannot be a matter of genuine moral consensus. Indeed, in his view, modern
politics is civil war carried on by other means.7" If this is indeed true, then
persons have radically different perceptions of their justice commitments. It
would be difficult then, if not impossible, for decision-makers to justify their
policies by reasons which would appeal to all members of the community.
It would appear that there are basically three contending approaches to
the question of deciding how much society should pay for health care. Since
a detailed discussion of these issues would far exceed the scope of this article,
I offer a summary outline. The first approach holds that there is a way of
discovering a just pattern for distribution. That is, in principle, we can determine what society ought to pay. The second position holds that there is
no way of discovering this, so that we can deal only with what society
chooses to pay or "willingness to pay."'" The third position holds that while
we cannot discover any obligatory pattern for distribution, we can determine
the criteria for a just procedure of decision-making.72
There are arguments which would seem to confirm the view that we can
indeed discover what constitutes a just pattern of distribution, at least in
some instances. Any attempt to deal with the justice issues in this matter
must entail some kind of comparison or weighing of, on one side, the resources of those (persons, groups and societies) who may provide the funds
and the needs, claims and/or rights of those who are to receive them. In the
weighing process, in the case of the ESRD program, the need of the prospec67.
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tive recipients is of an ultimate kind. Without dialysis (or transplant) they
will die. It would seem, then, that in this kind of case we can discover norms
of justice which establish persons' claims on the basis of evident and ultimate
need. This is not necessarily the case. If funding is provided for one group
of persons (sufferers from ESRD), then at some point it may have to be
withheld from others, and those others may die as a result.7 3 In such a case
we would be involved in weighing life against life and it is not at all clear
how this could be done.
Another possibility of discovering norms for just distribution would be to
put a value much less than life into the scales. The argument would then go
as follows. The projected expenditure for ESRD beneficiaries and program
expenditures for 1986 is $2.6 billion, for an estimated 96,000 patients. 74 Is
that too much to keep 96,000 people alive - many of them in active lives when the U.S. spends forty billion dollars for alcohol, thirty billion for tobacco, sixty-five billion for cosmetics, sixty-five billion for advertising, and
unspecified billions for illicit drugs, gambling and various types of luxuries? 75 If we compare a life, or lives, with the satisfaction to be received from
smoking or drinking, it would seem to be perfectly clear what should weigh
most. If the nation could agree to cut back its consumption of alcohol by
five percent or its use of tobacco by 6.6% and contribute what was thus
saved to the ESRD program it would be enough, and would save 96,000
lives. Many would accept that it would be virtuous to make such a sacrifice
to save others lives. However, it is not clear why those whose lives are
threatened have a claim in justice on particular citizens, nor is it clear on
what basis the state might claim the moral authority to exact that payment
76
through taxation.
However, I believe it is correct that one cannot argue, simply from a theory of justice, that a particular investment in providing health care is morally obligatory. But there is more to be said. Let us suppose that there is in
place a "system," in the sense used by Daniels, in which considerations of
justice are explicit, and which embraces the whole of society (rather than a
health care system only). If such existed, it would be possible to find the
established norms of justice and appeal to them to solve questions of allocation. The system of justice in the United States may admirably protect the
rights of the individual and promote justice in this sense. However, there is
73. Ruchlin, supra note 25, at 8.

74. Sage Interview, supra note 41.
75. Cf Pellegrino, supra note 64, at 37.
76. H. ENGELHARDT, supra note 72, at 366. However, as Engelhardt points out there
may be very important reasons to create such a claim or right or to see the provision of such
care as a duty of beneficence.

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy

82

[Vol. 3:65

no such institutionalized system of justice as described here. Even if there is
no institutionalized system, there could still be a widely accepted theory of
justice, which most persons would agree upon and to which appeals could be
made; but this is also lacking. Thus, however strongly one may advocate a
particular system of justice and call for its institutionalization in society, one
must accept that such a system does not (yet) exist in the United States.
In practical terms, this means that we cannot discover a pattern of justice
from which we can draw particular conclusions, such as, for example, that a
particular expenditure is justified or required for ESRD patients. On the
other hand, it is impossible, on the same grounds, to prove that a particular
expenditure on ESRD is not justified or unjust. It cannot be proved that it
costs too much. Such a line of argument, as is evident in Califano's latest
work, tends to assume that "cost-containment" is an absolute imperative,
but provides no adequate rationale for such a conclusion.7 7 It would appear

that this conclusion is based on the supposition that the United States cannot
pay so much or that Americans are not willing to pay so much. But neither
point is demonstrated. When we seek to establish the criteria for a just and
fair process of decision-making in this matter, we may not make "cost-containment" the fundamental and dominant norm.7 8
Does all this mean that we are compelled, nevertheless, to fall back on
what people are willing to pay? Is what people happen to decide to pay the
only available criteria? Are there no rational criteria available? I propose to
argue that this is not the case.
What the approaches which have been discussed so far have in common is
that they seek to derive answers to allocation questions from generalized
theories of justice or from general economic or political assumptions. They
fail to take adequate account of the requirements of the moral agency of
persons. That is, they ignore what I have called justice as participation. The
criteria of justice as participation do not specify any particular amount as
morally required, nor do they dictate what proportion of funding ought to be
given to the ESRD program. However, they do indicate how decisions in
this matter ought to be made and/or carried out. In other words, they provide criteria for a fair and just procedure of decision-making. In conclusion,
I will argue for some norms based on this notion.
JUSTICE AS PARTICIPATION: NORMS FOR DECISION-MAKING

Several scenarios could be envisioned and some relevant norms proposed.
77. J.
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1) Within some form of cost-containment policy, the physician strives to
limit the use of health care services. Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, Director of the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.,
would accept that such negative gatekeeping, under certain carefully defined
conditions of economic necessity and moral monitoring, might be morally
justifiable. 79 What might these conditions be? From what has been said

above, society could be justified in limiting funding for health care, and for
ESRD in particular. The decision must not be based on purely political considerations or a market approach to human needs.8 0 Justice as participation
would require that the reasons for such limits be openly stated and accessible, and that they reflect the social justice commitments of the persons affected to their wider community. The policy itself must be constructed so as
to respect providers and patients as moral agents with their due autonomy.
Physicians and other providers have claims to be able to pursue their moral
projects, that is to provide quality care. Patients have claims to be able to
pursue their projects, that is to seek quality care. The policy ought to respect these claims. Insofar as a physician carries out a policy of limitation
which conforms to these criteria, he would be acting in accord with justice as
participation.
2) An arbitrary limit is set by government agencies in the name of costcontainment so that some potential beneficiaries of dialysis must be excluded
or provided with less than quality care. Such a policy decision seriously
affects the structures necessary for these patients to pursue their moral
projects. Further, it does so for reasons which cannot be appropriated by
responsible moral agents, since there are, in effect, no moral reasons. The
community of moral agents is thus radically violated. Such a procedure fails
to meet the criteria of justice as participation.
3) A government agency constructs a policy with incentives towards certain forms of treatment (e.g., home-dialysis). The incentives are planned to
influence patient choices and the recommendations by physicians. If such
incentives were structured to induce persons to choose forms of treatment
solely because they were less expensive, and without regard for the medical
needs and legitimate preferences of patients, this would be morally objectionable. Such an inducement imposes extrinsic decisions on the physician-patient community. It would violate the specific autonomy of physicians as
agents committed to quality care, and likewise violate the moral autonomy
of patients as agents seeking quality care in fulfillment of their health needs.
79. Pellegrino, supra note 64, at 44.
80. Plough, Medical Technology and the Crisis of Experience: The Costs of Clinical Legitimation, 15 Soc. SCi. & MED. 89, 100 (1981).
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4) Physicians, acting as gatekeepers, exclude some patients on a-priorieconomic grounds based on government policies. Physicians might conceal the
economic and political reasons for the policy behind statements that the patient is not suitable, or simply not mentioning the availability of the treatment. Such a process would violate justice in excluding the patient from
being a participant in the decision. It would also be morally questionable in
inducing the physician to violate the requirements of his moral agency, specifically to forego the role of advocate of the patient, and to fail to honor his
trust relationship with the patient.
5) The physician engages in a form of "positive gatekeeping" in which he
encourages the use of health care facilities and services, such as dialysis, for
personal or corporate profit. Pellegrino holds that this is an indefensible
form of gatekeeping because "No moral justification can be mustered in its
favor." 8 Such a case might be where a physician induced a patient to undertake a certain form of dialysis or dialysis in a facility where another form
or home dialysis would be in the patient's genuine best interest, and did so
for motives of profit. In such a case, the structures of the relationship between responsible agents are distorted such that the patient is reduced to a
means to the physician's gain. However, an interest in profit, in itself, would
not necessarily distort the relationship. Such distortion would occur only
where it diverted the physician from acting as an agent of responsible
medicine.
6) The physician acts as gatekeeper in using only those diagnostic and
therapeutic modalities beneficial and effective for the patient. Pellegrino argues that this form of gatekeeping is both morally imperative and economically sound.8 2 There are circumstances where patients and/or families, in
consultation with medical professionals, choose not to undertake dialysis or
choose to have it stopped.8 3 There are situations in which such further treatment could be judged unduly burdensome and/or productive of no significant benefit to the patient. Such decisions would be morally justifiable. In
these cases the patients could be choosing as responsible agents, and the physicians exercising the ethic of agency in practicing responsible medicine.
There would be no distortion of the structures of the relevant relationships
through extrinsic considerations.
81. Pellegrino, supra note 64, at 44.
82. Id. It is not, however, clear why this would necessarily be "economically sound."
83. Neu & Kjellstrand, Stopping Long-Term Dialysis. An Empirical Study of Withdrawal
of Life-Supporting Treatment, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 14-20 (1986). See Smith, Triage:
Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143, 145 passim (1985).

